

SECRET/EXDISSALT TWO
SESSION I
A- 95MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
U.S. SALT DELEGATION
GENEVA, SWITZERLANDDATE: 15 December 1972
TIME: 1145 - 1240 Hours
PLACE: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUBJECT: SALT

PARTICIPANTS: US

USSR

Lt General R. B. Allison
Colonel C. G. FitzGerald
Lt Colonel F. P. DeSimone
(Interpreter)Lt General K. A. Trusov
Lt General I. I. Beletsky
Mr. Yu. V. Sudonkin
(Interpreter)

General Trusov indicated mild surprise at Ambassador Smith's proposal, during the just concluded mini-plenary, that the next meeting be a plenary and wondered whether this might indicate that the U.S. side attached some importance to a subject it intended to speak to at that meeting. I told Trusov that the mini-plenary meetings of the past two weeks had been useful for presentation of a number of considerations and questions though not all of the questions had yet been answered and he was correct in assuming that Amb Smith felt the plenary format more appropriate for the matter which the U.S. side would address on Monday.

I said that one of the subjects which needed additional clarification was the question of throw-weight limitation. The only Soviet response to our considerations on this subject so far was Academician Shchukin's comment that he did not consider the throw-weight question an urgent one. An exchange followed during which it was determined that due to Shchukin's use of a possibly ambiguous word and its rendition by the Soviet interpreter into English, we had received a slightly erroneous impression. According to Trusov, the view that Shchukin had intended to convey was that the question of throw-weight limitation was not critical for discussion at this time, since there are limitations in the Interim Agreement which already restrict throw-weight. Trusov added that in his view throw-weight was not an appropriate basis for limitations, taking into account the trend of missile development in the U.S. and the USSR.

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If we were to pursue that concept, both sides would end up having to develop similar missiles. I said we should not limit our thinking to what we see in the deployed forces of both sides today, but should look to the future in trying to work out a long-term agreement. Both sides will continue to have technology available which gives them an equal opportunity to modify their forces within the limits of an agreement. A limit on throw-weight would constitute an important part of the whole of limitations on strategic offensive missiles. It would help in my work between negotiating sessions to have something more complete in the way of Soviet views on the concept.

Trusov agreed that we should look to the future -- then spent much time trying to explain that it was the turn of the U.S. side to address the MIRV question, in the course of which he stated that he viewed the throw-weight and MIRV questions as closely related. He also paraphrased Shchukin's comment that the MIRV question should be re-opened in light of the new conditions created by the ABM Treaty. I responded that if the Soviet side has something to say in that context, it should be presented, adding that we had still not had an adequate response to the U.S. statement of its position on MIRV presented some time ago.

General Beletsky asked whether my presentation at today's meeting indicated that the U.S. intended to go ahead with its long-established and well-publicized Trident and B-1 programs independent of any agreement which might be concluded as a result of our current negotiations. Taking the opportunity of this inept question to chide Beletsky, I said that the U.S. Government abides by its agreements and could be expected to modify any strategic weapons programs in being as necessary to conform to the provisions of any strategic arms limitation agreement concluded at SALT. I said that we assumed the Soviet Government had the same attitude concerning, for example, its programs for new submarines, new ICBMs and new strategic bombers.

Trusov changed the subject to intercontinental and sea-based cruise missiles, and again attempted to reverse our roles as questioner and questioned by asking me for suggestions on ways to distinguish between those "specifically designed to strike land targets" and other cruise missiles. I told him that since the Soviet proposal created the requirement for distinguishing between them, it was a Soviet responsibility to suggest solutions to the problem, which was why I had asked him that very question

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during our last conversation. He offered nothing more specific than the comment that in order to strike land targets on the territory of the other side, a certain range capability would be required. Time did not permit him to respond to my comment that such an approach was inadequate.



SALDEL: Lt General Royal B. Allison, USAF
16 December 1972

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